Agent Passport™ Credential

APIS-001

The Agent Passport™ is the canonical credential for delegate identity in APIS v2.0. It is paired with a Machine Passport when the agent key is anchored to a machine, virtual machine, DNSSEC domain, software HSM, or development key.

Status: Version 2.0 — Canonical — Supersedes APIS v1.0
DID format: did:passport:[realm]:[uuid]
Signature algorithm: Ed25519 recommended (P-256 acceptable)

Required Claims

Claim	Description
`passport_id`	UUID of the credential record
`passport_did`	DID identifier in `did:passport` namespace
`issuer_id`	Issuer identity
`realm`	Issuer realm namespace
`issued_at`	RFC3339 issuance timestamp
`status`	`active`, `suspended`, or `revoked`
`public_key`	Agent JWK used for cryptographic binding
`key_fingerprint`	`SHA-256(public_key)`
`principal_id`	Principal accountable for delegate actions
`mandate_id`	Principal authorization binding this delegate to scoped authority
`machine_passport_id`	Machine Passport binding when applicable
`trust_tier`	`tier1-tpm`, `tier2-vtpm`, `tier2_5-dnssec`, `tier3-software-hsm`, or `tier4-development`
`memory_anchor_id`	Continuity anchor identifier
`revocation_nonce`	Monotonic nonce for instant token invalidation

Optional Claims

expires_at
delegate_id
software_id
software_version
framework
model_id
hardware_attestation
dnssec_record
issuer-defined extension claims

Issuance Requirements

A valid issuance flow must include:

Ownership context: realm, principal_id, optional owner_user_id.
Key binding: request includes agent public key.
Proof of possession:
1. Issuer returns random nonce.
2. Agent signs nonce with private key.
3. Issuer verifies signature before minting.
Trust-tier evidence:
1. Tier 1: TPM quote and certificate chain.
2. Tier 2: vTPM or platform attestation.
3. Tier 2.5: DNSSEC-signed TXT record binding key fingerprint to the realm.
4. Tier 3/4: software custody declaration.

No proof-of-possession means no passport.

Machine Passport Rule

A Machine Passport binds a registered machine, VM, DNSSEC-controlled domain, software HSM, or development key environment to a principal and trust tier. Agent Passports may reference machine_passport_id so verifiers can evaluate the machine trust anchor before accepting a signed action.

Memory Anchor Rule

Every passport must have memory_anchor_id.

If provided by requester: treat as opaque value.
If missing: issuer computes SHA-256(public_key).

Revocation Semantics

Passport™ starts with revocation_nonce = 0.
Any revocation event increments nonce.
Existing tokens become invalid when nonce changes.

Minimal Example

{
  "passport_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "passport_did": "did:passport:aetherpro.us:550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "issuer_id": "aetherpro-technologies",
  "realm": "aetherpro.us",
  "issued_at": "2026-02-08T00:00:00Z",
  "status": "active",
  "public_key": {
    "kty": "OKP",
    "crv": "Ed25519",
    "x": "base64url-encoded-public-key"
  },
  "key_fingerprint": "sha256:...",
  "principal_id": "principal-12345",
  "mandate_id": "mandate-789",
  "machine_passport_id": "machine-passport-123",
  "trust_tier": "tier1-tpm",
  "memory_anchor_id": "anchor-abcdef",
  "revocation_nonce": 0
}