Agent Passport™ Credential

APIS-001

The Agent Passport™ is the canonical credential for delegate identity in APIS v2.1. It is paired with a Machine Passport when the agent key is anchored to a machine, virtual machine, DNSSEC domain, software HSM, confidential-compute environment, or development key.

Status: Version 2.1 — Canonical — Supersedes APIS v2.0
DID format: did:passport:[realm]:[uuid]
Signature algorithm: Ed25519 recommended (P-256 acceptable)

Required Claims

Claim	Description
`passport_id`	UUID of the credential record
`passport_did`	DID identifier in `did:passport` namespace
`issuer_id`	Issuer identity
`realm`	Issuer realm namespace
`issued_at`	RFC3339 issuance timestamp
`status`	`active`, `suspended`, or `revoked`
`public_key`	Agent JWK used for cryptographic binding
`key_fingerprint`	`SHA-256(public_key)`
`principal_id`	Principal accountable for delegate actions
`mandate_id`	Principal authorization binding this delegate to scoped authority
`machine_passport_id`	Machine Passport binding when applicable
`trust_tier`	`tier1-tpm`, `tier1_5-vtpm`, `tier2_0-confidential`, `tier2_5-dnssec`, `tier3-software-hsm`, or `tier4-development`
`memory_anchor_id`	Continuity anchor identifier
`revocation_nonce`	Monotonic nonce for instant token invalidation

Optional Claims

expires_at
delegate_id
software_id
software_version
framework
model_id
hardware_attestation
dnssec_record
issuer-defined extension claims

Profile Relationship

An Agent Passport Profile is not the passport itself.

A profile describes the issuance recipe, agent class, capability envelope, and policy defaults.
A minted passport is the signed credential issued to one concrete agent instance.

Profiles make registry publication cleaner because verifiers can understand what class of agent they are evaluating before they inspect a specific passport artifact. See Agent Passport Profiles.

Issuance Requirements

A valid issuance flow must include:

Ownership context: realm, principal_id, optional owner_user_id.
Key binding: request includes agent public key.
Proof of possession:
1. Issuer returns random nonce.
2. Agent signs nonce with private key.
3. Issuer verifies signature before minting.
Trust-tier evidence:
1. Tier 1: TPM quote and certificate chain.
2. Tier 1.5: attestable vTPM evidence and cert chain.
3. Tier 2.0: confidential-compute attestation such as SEV-SNP or TDX quote.
4. Tier 2.5: DNSSEC or HTTPS namespace proof binding key fingerprint to the realm.
5. Tier 3/4: software custody declaration.

No proof-of-possession means no passport.

Machine Passport Rule

A Machine Passport binds a registered machine, VM, DNSSEC-controlled domain, software HSM, or development key environment to a principal and trust tier. Agent Passports may reference machine_passport_id so verifiers can evaluate the machine trust anchor before accepting a signed action.

Memory Anchor Rule

Every passport must have memory_anchor_id.

If provided by requester: treat as opaque value.
If missing: issuer computes SHA-256(public_key).

Revocation Semantics

Passport™ starts with revocation_nonce = 0.
Any revocation event increments nonce.
Existing tokens become invalid when nonce changes.

Minimal Example

{
  "passport_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "passport_did": "did:passport:aetherpro.us:550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "issuer_id": "aetherpro-technologies",
  "realm": "aetherpro.us",
  "issued_at": "2026-02-08T00:00:00Z",
  "status": "active",
  "public_key": {
    "kty": "OKP",
    "crv": "Ed25519",
    "x": "base64url-encoded-public-key"
  },
  "key_fingerprint": "sha256:...",
  "principal_id": "principal-12345",
  "mandate_id": "mandate-789",
  "machine_passport_id": "machine-passport-123",
  "trust_tier": "tier1-tpm",
  "memory_anchor_id": "anchor-abcdef",
  "revocation_nonce": 0
}